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The gist of Sri Bhashyam on ChatussUtrI--by Dr.NSA

From: padmini ranganathan (
Date: Mon Dec 20 1999 - 07:22:06 PST

PART = 10.


The Nirguna texts have greater force and they are
cancelling the Saguna texts according to the mimansa
principle, i.e., Appacchadanyaya.

7. The text of Taithiriya describing Brahman as
Satyam, Jananam, Anantham does not define qualities of

All the terms namely, Satya, Jnana and Anantha have
the same meaning. 
Here there is no non distinction. They are not
synonyms. The unity of purport is the same but yet
these words are expressing what is opposite 
in nature. The word 'Satya' distinguishes Brahma from
whatever is Asatya. The word 'Jnanam' or knowledge
distinguishes that from whatever is 
non-sentient. The word 'Anantha' distinguishes it from
whatever is limited in time or space or space or
nature. This  distinction is not 
either a positive attribute or a negative attribute of
Braman and all terms are just Brahman itself. So the
one Brahman which is self luminous and free from all
differences is declared by this text. Other
texts also declare the oneness of Brahman. So we
understand from the principle that all branches of the
Veda which teach the same doctrine that all these
speak of the one non - second Brahman itself.

An objection may be raised like this -

	If we accept your interpretation than the words
Satya, Jnana and  Anantha will be losing their primary
sense and will have to be taken in a secondary sense.
Is this not a fault ?

	To this, we answer that the general purport of a
sentence is more powerful than the direct meanings of
the simple terms. According to the principle of
coordination oneness is the purport and so there is no

	If, on this, another objection is raised that all the
words of a sentence are not to be understood in a
secondary sense, we say that there is not fault in it.
If the purport of the sentence is ascertained why 
should we not take one word or all words in the
secondary sense to make it fit with the general
purport. So, the Upanishadic statements are 
expounding Brahman that is not qualified by any


We pointed out that  in the case of a conflict or
contradiction between Sastra and Pratyaksha, the
Sastra is of greater force. But, there is not such
conflict because even in perception the non -
differnciated Brahman alone is apprehended. 


	Are we not preceiving different things of different
kinds as in the form of 'Here is a jar', 'Here is a
piece of cloth' etc. ? When it is 
so, how could it be said that perception causes the
apprehension of ''Tan Matra'.


	Let us examine the judgement. "Here is a jar", There
are two things (1) the nature of the jar and (2) its
difference from other things. 
These two cannot be the object of perception because
perceptual cognition takes place in one moment and
these two are related to different moments 
of time. So, it has to be admitted that the object of
perception is the essential nature of the thing. For
the apprehension of difference from other things
remembrance of other things different from it is
So difference is not apprehended by perception.


Logicians cannot give a definition of such a thing as
difference. Difference cannot be the essential nature
because it would result in the apprehension 
of the essential nature of a thing and at the same
time judgements as to its difference from everything.

It may be said that the judgement "This is different
from other things" depends upon the remembrance of its
counter entities and as long as there is no such
remembrance there is not the judgement of difference
formed so long.

We say this reasoning is not admissible because you
maintain that difference is nothing but essential
nature. So you have no right to assume a dependence 
on remembrance of counter entities etc.

As you do not depend upon the remembrance of counter
entities for the apprehension of essential nature, in
the same way you should not depend on counter entities
for apprehension of difference also. Therefore
difference is not the nature of the entity.

Nor, can you argue that difference is an attribute or
Dharma of an entity.

In that case you have to admit that is different from
essential nature. Difference is incapable of a logical
definition and we conclude that perception reveals
only "Being - Tanmatra".


We observe that the pure being alone persists in all
cognitions - like "Here is a jar", "Here is a piece of
cloth", The jar is perceived", etc. The differences
which do not persist are on the other hand not real.
This is also like the rope - snake analogy. The rope
which persists as the substrate is real while such
things that are wrongly superimposed on it 
as a snake, a cleft in the ground or a water course
are unreal.


This is not  a proper example because the non-reality
of the snake is the result of the cognition of the
true nature of the rope. It is not due to the non
persisting nature of the snake. In the same way the
reality of the rope does not follow from its
persistence but  from the fact that it is not sublated
by another cognition.

THE ANSWER for this is the varying of jars and pieces
of cloth is established like this. The judgement "This
is a jar" implies the negation of the cloth 
and others. Other things are sublated by the jar and
that proves the non - reality of whatever has non -
continuous existence. Just like the rope 
pure being persists not sublated therefore it is real.

Syllogism :

To continue........


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